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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/312
22 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Since hostilities erupted in Liberia on 6 April, the Security Council has been briefed on a daily basis on the main developments, including the widespread looting and complete breakdown of law and order that has engulfed Monrovia. Given the security situation, civilian and military non-essential personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had to be relocated to neighbouring countries. Their offices and equipment have been systematically looted. I should like to express my gratitude to the Government of the United States for the protection it provided to United Nations personnel at its Embassy in Monrovia during the first trying days of the crisis and in relocating United Nations personnel to neighbouring countries.

2. My Special Representative, Mr. Anthony Nyakyi, and some 25 UNOMIL civilian and military personnel, as well as a number of United Nations agency personnel, remain in Liberia to assist in bringing the crisis to a peaceful resolution and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as security conditions permit. My Special Envoy for Liberia, Mr. James Jonah, arrived in Monrovia on 18 April to assist in these efforts and to assess the future of the peace process and the role the United Nations could play in that regard. I will report to the Council on Mr. Jonah's findings and recommendations in due course.

3. The intense fighting witnessed in the first days of the crisis has now died down. Yet, armed fighters, driving vehicles taken from UNOMIL, United Nations agencies and NGOs, continue to roam and loot what is left of the city. Thousands of people have been displaced and are living in desperate conditions. Hundreds of innocent civilians, women and children, remain confined to the Barclay Training Centre, where forces of ULIMO-J, AFL and LPC are concentrated. Food and water are in short supply throughout most of the city and conditions are rife for the spread of endemic disease. While some markets continue to operate, given the extensive looting, it will take some time for the commercial sector to rebuild and for United Nations agencies to become fully operational. Even so, the United Nations humanitarian agencies have cooperated in taking a number of steps to prevent a major humanitarian crisis from developing and to help those who were victimized by the fighting. Emergency food aid has been distributed to many of those in greatest need and steps are being taken to reactivate water and sanitation services.

4. In my report of 1 April 1996 (S/1996/232), I stated that the situation in Liberia was rapidly deteriorating and I expressed my fear that unless the peace process was put back on track very quickly, the consequences could be disastrous. However, I did not expect that the fragile peace in that country would unravel as quickly or as profoundly as it did over the past couple of weeks.

5. I am deeply saddened by the recent events in Liberia, but I am also gratified by the way in which the international community has worked together to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis. UNOMIL and ECOWAS, with the Ambassadors of Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the United States, have undertaken intensive mediation efforts with the Krahn forces on the one hand, and those of Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah on the other, to put an end to the fighting and find ways of reactivating the peace process foreseen under the Abuja Agreement of August 1995. These efforts began to bear fruit yesterday, 18 April, when a first meeting was held, under the auspices of UNOMIL, at the United States Embassy with the leaders of the Krahn forces, representing ULIMO-J, LPC, AFL, and the civilians being held at the Barclay Training Centre. I am pleased to report that a number of civilians held at the centre were released today and that more are expected to be released in the coming days.

6. I urge the faction leaders to cooperate fully with the international community in seeking a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Peace will not come to Liberia unless they are willing to work together towards genuine national reconciliation, and respect for the basic human rights of the citizens of their country. They must immediately restore the cease-fire, disengage their forces and return to the Abuja peace process, which offered the Liberian people the hope that peace and stability would finally come to their country.

7. The faction leaders and their fighters must also ensure that the international agencies trying to assist the innocent people of Liberia are allowed to fulfil their respective mandates in conditions of peace and security. The first step, in this regard, should be the immediate return of the vehicles and equipment taken by the factions from UNOMIL, the United Nations agencies and NGOs. The ability of UNOMIL to continue to assist the peace process will depend to a large extent on the fulfilment of these basic conditions.

8. The recent events in Monrovia have dramatically demonstrated that the lack of manpower and logistics from which ECOMOG has chronically suffered has seriously undermined its operational effectiveness. During the recent crisis, ECOMOG had a number of casualties, some of its troops were disarmed and abused by the fighters and a number of its soldiers were taken hostage. ECOMOG has tried to do what it can under extremely difficult circumstances. I, nevertheless, hope that the force will take additional steps to maintain security in Monrovia in order to establish the confidence required for the factions to withdraw from the city and for the displaced people to return to their homes.

9. I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/313
23 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1049 (1996) of 5 March 1996 in which the Council requested me to keep it informed on the situation in Burundi. I regret that I have to convey to you and the members of the Council alarming information received from my Special Representative in that country.

The security situation in Burundi took another turn for the worse during the month of March. The relative quiet of February gave way to a sharp increase in the number of attacks by Hutu rebels belonging to the armed wing of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), to the National Liberation Front (FROLINA) and to the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU). Heavy fighting, which used to be concentrated in the northern part of the country, has now spread to areas in the south previously untouched by the conflicts. It is estimated that there may now be a few thousand rebels in that part of the country and they are reported to be establishing casual or light fortifications and using more sophisticated equipment than hitherto, including mines. The interruption of fishing in Lake Tanganyika, which is causing supply problems in the capital, is a good demonstration of the determination of the armed forces to stop the movement and infiltration of rebels to and from Zaire.

On the political front, some serious differences have appeared between the President and the prime Minister, particularly on the issue of negotiations with the armed opposition. The President has publicly favoured negotiations on condition that the rebels give up violence, while the Prime Minister has expressed opposition to any negotiation with groups such as CNDD and has invited the Tutsi community to arm itself. There are reports that some armament was distributed recently to civilians in Bujumbura and elsewhere.

The European Union and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which visited Bujumbura last week, have stressed to the leadership in Burundi that economic assistance would not be forthcoming as long as the political and security situations remained unstable. In response, the Prime Minister disclaimed Burundi's need for foreign aid.

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The situation has deteriorated to the point that senior parliamentarians have expressed deep concern that the armed forces might engage in reprisals against the Hutu population still living in Bujumbura and its suburbs. The Prime Minister's call to arm the population as well as his claim that Burundi did not need foreign aid have been severely criticized. There are also some reports that the National Assembly would suspend its session shortly since it could not obtain the programme of action which it had been requesting for several months from the Government.

The international community has been alerted, notably by the latest report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights who, upon returning from Burundi, spoke of a creeping genocide ("génocide au compte-gouttes"). As the Security Council knows, the Special Rapporteur has called for sanctions against those responsible for the violence, while my Special Representative in Burundi has continued to appeal to all concerned for an immediate end to the violence and for a constructive dialogue among the main protagonists.

Former President Nyerere's ongoing effort with regard to Burundi is taking place in a very tense environment. While we will soon know whether the envisaged dialogue has any chance of being started, I fear that there is a real danger of the situation in Burundi degenerating to the point where it might erupt into a genocidal conflict. Meanwhile, the Secretariat continues to consult Member States in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1049 (1996). I hope shortly to report the results to the Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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23 April 1996

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 23 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the European Union I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a declaration of the Presidency of the European Union on the latest Israeli bombing in southern Lebanon.

I would be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI

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ANNEX

[Original: English and French]

Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the latest Israeli bombings in southern Lebanon

The news of so many dead and wounded Lebanese refugees and of the 120 wounded in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) camp has been received by the European Union with shock and profound consternation. The European Union believes that this escalation of senseless violence which is felling so many innocent lives must be absolutely stopped and renews its appeal to all parties concerned to cease immediately all military activities in the area.

Rome, 18 April 1996.

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GENERAL

S/1996/315
23 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached communication dated 23 April 1996, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I would appreciate your bringing it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Letter dated 23 April 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, I enclose herewith the fifth report on the operations of the multinational implementation force (IFOR). I would appreciate your making the report available to the members of the Security Council.

On 18 April (D+120) we passed a major milestone in the implementation of annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general I am satisfied with the cooperation and compliance of the Parties in implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement to date, although, as you will note from the report, their efforts to come into compliance with the D+120 requirements have been affected by practical difficulties. The cantonment and demobilization of forces by all Parties are expected to proceed, and IFOR will continue actively to monitor progress towards compliance in this area.

Regrettably, tensions continue, as evidenced by the two civil confrontations over the past weekend. Such tensions may grow more acute as the thousands of refugees and displaced persons begin their repatriation. The success of IFOR remains closely linked to the success of the civilian mission, particularly concerning the elections and economic reconstruction. Within its capabilities, and as far as its principal tasks allow, I can assure you that IFOR will continue to maintain the closest possible cooperation with civilian agencies, and particularly the Office of the High Representative, to ensure a successful conclusion to the remaining eight months of our mandate.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Enclosure

Fifth report to the Security Council on the operations of the multinational implementation force (IFOR)

IFOR operations

1. The multinational implementation force (IFOR) now comprises approximately 55,000 personnel in theatre, from all the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from 16 non-NATO contributors. Offers from further non-NATO countries are still pending. IFOR air assets continue to provide sufficient capability to secure the airspace, defend and support IFOR ground forces and monitor compliance. IFOR maritime assets also remain deployed in support of IFOR.

2. IFOR continues to carry out its primary task of implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement by monitoring, and where necessary ensuring, compliance by the Parties with their obligations under annex 1-A. IFOR forces have been heavily engaged in ground and aerial surveillance of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and the Zone of Separation, including the destruction of bunkers; monitoring of de-mining; the movement of air defence and heavy weapons to agreed barracks/cantonment sites; and country-wide patrolling, including the removal of illegal checkpoints in order to ensure freedom of movement also for the civilian population. In addition, IFOR continues to assist a range of civil organizations, on a case-by-case basis, from available resources without detriment to its primary mission.

3. IFOR's robust capabilities and rules of engagement enable it to defend itself effectively and to provide protection for others involved in implementing the Peace Agreement. By far the greatest risk to IFOR as well as other personnel remains the very large number of mines that are scattered throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Incidents continue to cause casualties among IFOR personnel and local people.

Cooperation and compliance by the Parties

4. IFOR will continue to execute its mission in an even-handed manner. There continues to be reasonable adherence to annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement by all Parties, but efforts to come into compliance with the requirements specified for D+120 (18 April) for cantonment and demobilization appear to be limited by practical considerations. The overall assessment is that:

- The cease-fire continues to hold and the Parties remain generally in compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities;

- Generally all Parties have been in compliance with the Zone of Separation around the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. Local violations by all Parties have continued to occur, although such violations have decreased in number since the last report;

- All Parties are moving heavy weapons and forces to agreed cantonment areas and are pursuing the demobilization of forces required at D+120. However, compliance has proved to be difficult within this time scale as the scale and complexity of this task have exceeded the military organizational capabilities of the Parties. IFOR is actively monitoring progress towards compliance and is inspecting designated cantonment sites with effect from D+121 (19 April). Air defence systems, which were to have been secured in designated sites by D+90 (19 March), are now subject to confiscation when discovered outside agreed cantonments;

- It remains unclear whether full compliance has been achieved on the removal of foreign forces. Although the Parties have undertaken to reach compliance with article III of annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement, it is likely that a small number of foreign forces remain in contravention of the Peace Agreement. IFOR will continue to insist on full compliance as soon as possible;

- Thanks to the efforts of the High Representative, a major release by all Parties of prisoners of war took place during the beginning of April. Each of the Parties continues to hold a number of prisoners, although in many cases they have provided dossiers on these individuals to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for possible investigation as war criminals. IFOR is actively cooperating with the International Committee of the Red Cross to establish accurate records;

- Restrictions on the freedom of movement of civilians, refugees and displaced persons continue to cause concern. Illegal checkpoints discovered by IFOR are immediately removed by IFOR forces and the International Police Task Force.

5. The Joint Military Commission and its supporting structure of military commissions are operating effectively. In particular, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line Subcommittee has made progress in helping the Parties negotiate adjustments to the Boundary Line.

Cooperation with the High Representative and international organizations

6. The civil aspects of the Peace Agreement remain crucial to its success and IFOR has continued to assist the High Representative and the international organizations involved in civil implementation, as far as its principal tasks, as defined in the Peace Agreement, and available resources allow. IFOR is already engaged in supporting a number of reconstruction projects, including route upgrading; bridging and maintenance; recommissioning and reconnecting vital utility plants; refurbishment of schools, medical facilities and other community amenities; and assistance with specialized transportation of materials. IFOR continues to provide security and logistical support to teams of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia investigating possible mass grave sites, such as one examined near Srebrenica earlier this month. IFOR and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) planners are also continuing to cooperate in examining the potential support to be provided by IFOR for elections.

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S/1996/316
23 April 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 APRIL 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace committed by aircraft of the United States, the United Kingdom and France continued over the period from 1 to 15 April 1996 and that those aircraft carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation. The details are as follows:

1. Northern region: 67 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Aqrah, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

2. Southern region: 626 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Faraj, Qala'at Salih, Basra, Salman, Amarah, Shanafiyah and Lasaf.

3. Twelve sorties by United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres which violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.

4. At 1325 hours on 2 April 1996, a hostile formation broke the sound barrier over an area 20 kilometres south of Qurnah.

I request you to intervene with the above-mentioned States in order that they should cease these activities, which threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and constitute flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law.

These acts continue to terrorize civilians and to cause material damage to personal property and public facilities. The Republic of Iraq reaffirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage caused to the Republic of Iraq and its people.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1996/317
24 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1996 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the matter on the agenda of the Security Council, relating to implementation of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996), I have the honour to enclose herewith a transcript of the interviews of the three suspects and Abeba Siraj, the wife of one of the suspects, who are under Ethiopian custody in connection with the terrorist assassination attempt against the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt on 26 June 1995 in Addis Ababa. I also wish to inform you that videotapes containing the above-mentioned interviews are provided to all members of the Security Council.

The interviews of the four individuals contained in the videotape and transcript made available to members of the Security Council clearly show not only that the three terrorists, whose extradition to Ethiopia is demanded in Security Council resolution 1044 (1996), reside in the Sudan, but also confirm that the Government of the Sudan is deeply involved in the assassination attempt.

I should be grateful if you could have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fesseha A. TESSEMA
Deputy Permanent Representative

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Annex

PART ONE: COMMENTARY

"To kill a president: the Sudan and the assassination attempt on the life of Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt"

The thirty-first summit of African leaders was held in June 1995 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This is an annual meeting, and the city of Addis Ababa was eagerly awaiting the arrival of leaders from some 52 countries.

As African leaders came from all over the continent to meet and discuss the pressing issues faced by Africa, a shocking event was witnessed just a few hours before the opening of the meeting.

The morning of 26 June 1995 was the very day when the summit was due to begin, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was one of the last African leaders to arrive.

On arrival at Bole International Airport, the Egyptian President was welcomed by Ethiopia's President Meles Zenawi. President Mubarak's motorcade left the airport for the city some minutes past 8 o'clock in the morning.

No sooner had the presidential motorcade left the airport than a roar of gunfire was heard not far from the airport. It was not possible to comprehend what was happening. The gunfire was no accident. It represented an attempt on the life of the Egyptian President a mere kilometre away from the airport.

Along what is known as Bole Road, which leads from the airport to the city, a gang of terrorists were awaiting to ambush the Presidential motorcade and, thereby, assassinate President Mubarak. The attempt was foiled by the Ethiopian security forces, who were on guard along the road. Two of the terrorists, namely Abdulkadoos Al-Khaddi (commonly known as Mohammed) and Mustafa Abdel Azziz Mohammed (also known as Turki) were shot dead on the spot. Two Ethiopian security personnel and one traffic policeman died in the gunfire exchange, while two other policemen were wounded. President Mubarak's motorcade made a U-turn to the airport, where he boarded his plane and departed for home.

The search for the escaped terrorists and the investigations began immediately. It became clear early on that the terrorists were members of the Egyptian Gama'a Al-Islamiya, and that a total of 11 people were involved in the plot. The details are as follows.

1. Mustafa Hamza. Known as Ibrahim. A leader of the organization currently residing in the Sudan.

2. Izzat. A deputy of Mustafa Hamza also residing in the Sudan.

3. Husain Ahmed Shahit Ali. Also known as Siraj or Fathi. He left Addis Ababa for Khartoum a few hours after the failed assassination attempt using a Sudanese passport under the name Faisal Lutfi Abdellatif. Currently residing in the Sudan.

4. Abdulkudoos Al-Khadi. Known as Mohammed. Killed during the assassination attempt.

5. Mustafa Abdul Azziz Mohammed. Known as "Turki". Killed during the assassination attempt.

6. Sharif Abdel Al-Rahman. Known as Omar. In charge of the Addis operation. Killed resisting arrest.

7. Abdulhadi Mukawwed. Known as Hamza. Killed resisting arrest.

8. Muhammed Abdel Al-Radi. Known also as Yasin. Killed resisting arrest.

Of the 11 plotters, 5 have been killed, 3 live in the Sudan and 3 are in the custody of the Government of Ethiopia. You will be hearing from the three in custody, today known in short as Faisal, Khalifa and Yassin.

1. Faisal

His real name is Sefwat Hassan Abdul Ghanni Atique.

He holds a Sudanese passport under the cover name of Faisal Mohammed Ahmed. He is also known by another name as Rabeh.

According to the testimony he gave the police, Sefwat is an Egyptian citizen who was born in Aswan in 1964.

While he was on a Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia in 1990, he heard of the Youth Wing of the Mujahidin, which he later joined. After having undergone military training in Afghanistan and after spending some time in Kenya, Sefwat managed to meet the highest executive officials of the military wing of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya organization, and together with other members spent some years on some farms in the Sudan owned by the terrorist group.

Sefwat asserts that he came to Ethiopia on Sudan Airways with a certain Faisal Lutfi or Siraj on the strict instructions of Mustafa Hamza, also known as Ibrahim. Mustafa Hamza is one of the top leaders of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. He was once jailed by Egyptian authorities because he was suspected of involvement in the assassination mission of the late President Sadat. Sefwat Hassan was meant to run a spare parts shop in Addis Ababa. Financing was made available to him from the organization to start the business.

Sefwat Hassan got married to an Ethiopian girl named Abeba Siraj, whom he used as an additional cover. Together they travelled to Khartoum, where they met Mustafa Hamza, the ring leader.

Sefwat Hassan's involvement in the assassination plot was to provide logistical support such as renting houses, procuring weapons, passports and so on.

2. Yassin

His real name is Abdul Karim Al-Nadi Abdulrai Ahmed. He is also known by two other names under a Yemeni passport: Yassin Abdulhamid Ahmed and Hamza Abdul Karim Mohammed al Nuhaim.

He says he is an Egyptian born in Armend in 1968.

He joined the extremist Gama'a Al-Islamiya in Egypt and went to Afghanistan, where he received military training for two months. He claims to have fought twice in the war in Afghanistan waged between the Mujahidin and the Soviet troops.

It was there that he, for the first time, met Mustafa Hamza, also a council member of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya, who ordered him to go to the farms owned by the Gama'a Al-Islamiya in the Sudan.

Yassin and Ihab came to Addis Ababa with Egyptian passports to do some reconnaissance on ways of assassinating President Mubarak, who was expected to attend the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit at Addis Ababa. They were met by Siraj, also known as Fathi, at the Bole Airport in Addis Ababa. They were lodged in a house at the disposal of the operation and began assessing the security situation and details of preparations concerning the receiving of African Heads of State in the country.

In addition, both travelled to Metema on the Ethiopian-Sudanese border and slipped into the Sudan in a rehearsal of an escape route they would use. The rehearsal gave them an idea of distances as well as possible problems they could expect to encounter.

Once the reconnaissance was over, they both came back to Addis Ababa for the second time.

3. Khalifa

His real name is Al-Arabi Sadiki Hafez Mohammed. He is also known as Ahmed Mohammed Ali under a Yemeni passport. He was named Khalifa when he was in Afghanistan.

The following are Khalifa's answers about his identity:

(see interview)

4. Abeba Siraj

Abeba Siraj is here to tell us about herself and her marriage to Faisal (see interview).

This is the extent of the information the three were willing to divulge concerning their identity. The question that needs to be answered is "why"? Why did the group want President Mubarak dead? They all agree that he deserved to die and they give their rationale in what follows.

Let us listen from each one of them about the extent of their involvement in the attempted assassination plot.

We now shall listen to the information the three people have concerning the role of the Sudan and also their unabated stable life in the Sudan.

The role of the Sudan and life in the Sudan

The role of the Government and security organs of the Sudan and that of the National Islamic Front, led by Dr. Turabi, is central in the assassination scheme. The three terrorists now under custody in Ethiopia have, under interrogation by Ethiopian authorities, revealed the direct participation and involvement of the Government and security organs of the Sudan and the National Islamic Front in terms of providing protection and sanctuary to the terrorists and in facilitating the entire operation to assassinate Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Faisal, or Sefwat, the terrorist responsible for providing logistical support openly admits that full backing and support was rendered to his organization, the Gama'a Al-Islamiya, by the Government and security organs of the Sudan. While giving more details on their degree of participation, he said their role was: (1) to provide weapons; (2) to facilitate security cover for the operation; (3) to provide accommodation to the terrorists; (4) to render facilities such as purchasing of vehicles, renting of houses and making travelling documents available.

He said his organization was grateful for what they had done. Yassin, the other terrorist under custody, has admitted that one of the roles of the Government of the Sudan was to provide security cover to the members of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya in the Sudan so that they would not be exposed to the Egyptian security operating in that territory. He said giving more details on this matter would expose the Gama'a Al-Islamiya group in the Sudan and his compatriots in Egypt.

Khalifa, the third terrorist under the custody of the Government of Ethiopia, describes the relationship between the Government of the Sudan and that of his organization as a political one. The Sudan being an Islamic State, he said that the Sudanese Government promotes this plan and encourages its implementation because it follows the laws of Allah.

The three terrorists and Mrs. Abeba Siraj, the Ethiopian girl who got married to Sefwat, alias Faisal, will give us their own versions of various aspects of the involvement of the Sudan in the organization and execution of the plot to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak.

Before we conclude our presentation we wish to raise a few points. First, as Abeba Siraj and her husband, Faisal, indicate, the three wanted for prosecution, including Mustafa Hamza were not people who simply went through the Sudan or who sneak in and out of the Sudan. They are well established in the Sudan, with connections, families and friends. Secondly, with regard to Sudanese security personnel mentioned by Faisal, Ethiopia has confirmed through its own means that the named are in fact members of the External Security Service of the Sudan.

Finally, though Faisal has defended the entire rationale of the attempted assassination plot and as well expressed the deepest gratitude towards the role played by the Sudan, he seems to have some hiccups concerning the choice made of having Ethiopia as a battleground to undertake their stated objective, to kill the President. Let us listen to what he has to say.

PART TWO: INTERVIEWS OF THE THREE SUSPECTS AND ABEBA SIRAJ, THE ETHIOPIAN WIFE OF FAISAL

Faisal

Real name: Sefwat Hassen Abdul Ghanni

Code name: Rabeh

To Gama'a Al-Islamiya: Rabeh

Name for different purposes:

(a) Egyptian passport: Sefwat Hassen Abdul Ghanni

(b) Sudanese passport: Faisal Mohammed Ahmed

I was born in 1964 in the western province of Aswan in Egypt. I have no idea of the month or day of my birth. I also don't remember in what house or hospital I was born. My father's name is Hassen Abdul Ghanni Atik. When I left my native land, my father was still alive. My father was living in western Aswan. He was a government employee. My brothers and sisters are Mohammed, Umama, Mariam and Zaineba. They live in western Aswan. When I left my country they were still living there. My father is about 60 years old. My mother's name is Nebewuya Mohammed Taha. She was also alive when I left Egypt. She lives in western Aswan. She is unemployed. My mother is about 50 years old.

I learned the Koran at a government school called Western Aswan. I don't remember the name of the man who taught me the Koran.

I completed my Koranic education in western Aswan. Later, I attended the teachers' training institute. This marked the last stage of my education in Aswan.

I was employed as an elementary-school teacher in western Aswan.

I wasn't engaged in any other occupation. I was being paid 50 Egyptian pounds a month as a teacher. I have no professional calling other than that of teaching. My hobby is playing table tennis.

In Egypt, national military service is a must. However, through orders received from the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic, those who are involved in religious movements are not obliged to participate in national service.

I didn't take a paid job outside Egypt.

I was married a year ago to Abeba Siraj. She lives in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

I don't remembers the name of the person who arranged the marriage for me.

I have fathered a daughter named Zahara. She is one year old. She lives near the bus depot in the vicinity of Geneme School in house number 712.

Yassin

Question: What is your real name?

Answer: My real name is Abdul Karim Al-Nadi Abdulrai Ahmed.

Question: Do you have any assumed names?

Answer: I don't have assumed names in Egypt. My assumed name since I left Egypt is Yassin.

I used Hamza Abdul Karin Mohammed al Nuhaim on my Yemeni passport.

Question: What is the date, month and year of your birth?

Answer: It is 6/12/1967.

Question: Where were you born?

Answer: Egypt.

Question: Which province?

Answer: The province is Kina in the Armend district, the name of the village is Nejj Denkul.

Question: Which quarter (part of the village)?

Answer: Well, it is Nejj Denkul.

Question: Tell us the names of your father, your father's father and your father's grandfather.

Answer: Al-Nadi Abdulrai Ahmed.

Question: Tell us your father's address.

Answer: Kina province, Armend district, Nejj Denkul village.

Question: What is the job of your father?

Answer: He was previously working in a sugar factory in Armend. He has been retired.

Question: What are the names of your brothers and sisters on your father's side?

Answer: I have one brother on my father's side. His name is Mohammed Al-Nadi Abdulrai Ahmed, and the rest of my sisters and brothers were born

from the same father and mother. They are Abdulnadi Abdurai, Abdulhamid Abdularai, Abdul Karim, Mohammed and Ahmed, and my elder sister is Nadia and the younger one is Shadia and their address is Nejj Denkul.

Question: What is the name of your mother, your mother's father and your mother's grandfather?

Answer: Resmiya Ahmed Suleiman Hassen.

Question: What is the name of the school that you attended last. What is its address?

Answer: It is a technical secondary school in Armend from which I graduated with a diploma in 1985/86.

Question: Tell us the places of your work, the names of the companies and how much you were earning?

Answer: I had no government job. I was working as a daily labourer in building construction, and I was earning five Egyptian pounds per day.

Abeba

My name is Abeba Siraj. I was born in Addis Ababa in the Rufael area on 7 September 1972. I attended school until seventh grade, but quit for health reasons. I have been unwell for nine years, and it was when my health began to improve that I got married. A neighbour of ours called Sheikh Said called me and asked if I was willing to marry a Sudanese man who wished to marry me. I told him that if the man was known to be good and kind, and that if my parents consented, I would agree. I met my future husband and agreed. When my parents consented, my father asked about his occupation. The Sheikh told my father that the person was an automobile spare parts dealer and that he would suit me. My father informed me that he would not put pressure in me to leave the house and get married, and that I would only leave if I wished. I told him it was my will to leave and it was in the month of May that we got married. After a few months we went to the Sudan.

Khalifa

He is also known as Ahmed Mohammed Ali under a Yemini passport. Khalifa is an Egyptian born in 1967 in Merkza Megaga. He had undergone a three-month military training in 1987 under the Egyptian National Service programme. He claims that he had willingly become a member of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. Khalifa came to Ethiopia in 1995 direct from Karachi with the airfare Omar gave him. In Ethiopia he met Siraj.

He identifies Siraj as the one who welcomed him to Ethiopia and who provided instructions to the people involved in the assassination attempt on President Mubarak. During the week prior to the OAU summit, when African

Ministers were meeting at Addis Ababa, Khalifa and other plotters had Bole Road leading to and from the airport under surveillance.

"Mohammed" and "Turki" mapped out their survey. They presented it to Omar and together they deliberated on it.

The original plan was to carry out the assassination around the meeting place of the leaders. But since security was tight around that area, and following the suggestion of Omar to carry out the operation near the ... airport, the plan was changed. Like all members of the gang, Khalifa was also given a task to accomplish.

Question: What is your correct name, that given you by your father and mother?

Answer: Al-Arabi Sadiki Hafez Mohammed.

Question: You are a member of the organization. What names have you been given?

Answer: Khalifa Ahmed Mohammed Ali Atif.

Question: When were you given this name?

Answer: I was named Khalifa when I was in Afghanistan from 1992 to 1995.

Question: When were you born?

Answer: 24 March 1967.

Question: Where were you born?

Answer: Egypt.

Question: Which region?

Answer: Al Minia.

Question: In which town?

Answer: Megaga.

Question: In which locality were you born?

Answer: Izbet al Kilo.

Question: Identify your grandfather's and his grandfather's name.

Answer: Said Hafez Mohammed.

Question: What is your father's address?

Answer: Megaga.

Question: Give us the names, number and address of your brothers and sisters on your father's side.

Answer: My brother Mohammed is in Megaga. My sisters are Fathia, Fatuma, Shadia, Redwa and Hanan. Fathia and Hanan live in Megaga. Shadia lives in Ahba and Redwa and Fatuma are in Cairo.

Question: What is your mother's name?

Answer: Aida Bedir Abu Aleil Ahmed.

Question: At what school did you learn to read the Koran? What is the school's address and the name of your teacher?

Answer: The school is in Megaga. The school not only teaches the Koran but modern education as well. It is called Al Hurriya.

Question: Which is your last school?

Answer: Al Hurriya Elementary School.

Question: Where did you work?

Answer: I didn't. I worked only with my father.

Faisal explains

Answer: There are various reasons why it was necessary. One of these reasons is that, as the whole world knows, Mubarak is not governed by the laws of God. There are also other reasons not familiar to many people. Mubarak is butchering Muslims. All his efforts are directed towards fighting Islam and Muslims. However, one thing should not be forgotten. This is that through such activities Mubarak is waging war against Allah. No human being can conduct war against Allah and his messenger. If he persists in these activities, Mubarak must expect war from Allah and his messenger. Any person who thinks in terms of fighting Allah and his messenger must be morally bankrupt in both worlds, the temporal and the eternal ... Mubarak's deeds fall within this category ... If we kill by treading the path charted by Allah, a generation would be fast on our footsteps which would wage war on the Egyptian Government and thereby establish an Islamic government. This is inevitable, no matter how long it takes. Surely, the whole world must turn Islamic. This is what the prophet Mohammed had taught and digressed at length on. Ah ... the ultimate victory would be ours. An Islamic state and an Islamic kalefit would be established. After that, our Lord Essa (Jesus) would descend to earth from heaven. This would happen when the whole world turns Islamic; that is to say, when the laws of Allah gain supremacy in the world. The words of the prophet Mohammed confirm this ... We want to die in the path charted by Allah. We pray to Allah that he would vest us with this mantle of supreme honour ...

So long as we remain committed Muslims, there is no distinction between Ethiopians, Sudanese, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Yemenis and Saudis.

Khalifa

Question: Why did Gama'a Al-Islamiya decide to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak?

Answer: Every Muslim who struggles for the victory of the faith of Allah on earth has a duty to kill him. He does not rule according to the laws of Allah. According to the Koran and the words of prophet Mohammed, there is an obligation to destroy him and others like him, both Arabs and non-Arabs.

Yassin

Question: Why was the assassination of President Hosni Mubarak necessary?

Answer: Honestly this question requires a detailed explanation. There are a number of reasons for it. I can, however, summarize it with a quotation from the Koran (he quotes from the Koran).

If I mention what Mubarak has done and is now doing you may say that I am biased. But let me mention only one thing. You can ask humanitarian organizations about the atrocities committed by the Egyptian system against the prisoners and their families. Their acts are known to everybody including children.

All citizens know about this. Let me mention a few things about it. They raid apartments and kill unarmed youngsters simply based on suspicion. Then they take the dead bodies to other places where they exhibit the dead bodies with arms on their side to say that they were killed while opposing the system.

This is a minor example. As I told you earlier, if you inquire from the Egyptian Human Rights Organization, you will get a better answer than mine.

Question: We want you to tell us your life history. How did you leave Egypt and go to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan as a member of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya and get trained before returning to the Sudan. How did you come to Ethiopia to study the situation and receive instruction from Ibrahim.

Answer: I became a member of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya before I left Egypt. In each district and province there is one leader of the organization. It was our leader Mohammed Dandrawi who told me to go to Pakistan. It was also my wish to go. Then I prepared the documents necessary for my travel and started my journey from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and from there to Pakistan and then Afghanistan. In short, it was a Hajj (pilgrimage) journey. In my Hajj trip to Saudi Arabia I was not

alone. There were two people with me. One of them, called Hafez, knew the route since he had previously travelled for Umrra prayers to Saudi Arabia. He was my contact person with members of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. After we performed our prayers and established contact with members of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya who prepared all that was necessary for our travel, including tickets, we proceeded to Pakistan. On our arrival, we met members of the organization who were waiting to receive us. They took us to a house. The house is in Hayat Abad. After staying in this house for 10 days, we prepared ourselves to leave for Afghanistan. A man named Mansur took us to Afghanistan to a training camp near a place called Sala. There we were given training which lasted for almost one month and a half. Then we joined the Afghan army and fought against the Russian army. Since our leaders did not allow us to, we did not stay long at the war front. I mean, Majdi and me. When I said our leaders, I meant Ibrahim. They wanted to send us to a farm in the Sudan; therefore, they did not want us to stay there for long. I am not very sure how long we stayed in Pakistan, but it could be two years.

Ibrahim then told us, Majdi and me, about the trip. Majdi and I came from the same country. On the instruction of Mustafa Hamza to proceed to the Sudan and work on the farm, we went to the Sudan. The person who received us is called Osman. He is an Egyptian and a member of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. His house is located near a place called Al-Huriya. We stayed for about one month in this house. The year was 1993 or the end of 1992. Before we came to the farm, two persons who were members of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya were working on the farm. They hated the farm work since it was very hard. We came to replace them, and they were allowed to go where they wanted.

After staying for one month in the house, Majdi and I, we went to the farm. There were two people with us. One was called Hamza and the other was called Hussein. Hamza stayed with us at the farm to show us how to contact the people and to tell us about the farm, etc.

Basically, Magdi was in charge of the farm. They put me with him because we came from the same country and because I had some knowledge about farming.

The size of the farm is about 42 or 43 feddan. It is located 10 to 12 kilometres from Khartoum, near a place called Soba.

Regarding the farmhouse, it has a large bedroom, a store, a kitchen, two bathrooms, one toilet and one water storage.

Question: Tell us about the people you know in the Sudan.

Answer: There is a Sudanese called Mudesir, who was working with Ibrahim, and there was one called Hysem, who used to come to the house. I believe he is a teacher, but I am not sure.

Question: What was Mudesir's job?

Answer: Mudesir was working with Ibrahim, not with us. However, as I said earlier, whenever there was a problem regarding the farm with neighbouring farms, Magdi informed Ibrahim about it, who, in turn, advised that Mudesir should be informed.

Question: Other than this, what kind of work was Mudesir involved in?

Answer: Honestly, Mudesir had lots of work.

Question: Was Mudesir one of the officials?

Answer: I don't know. I don't know his job. The assistance he rendered, however, was a lot. He also had close contacts.

I stayed for some time on the farm in the Sudan. Then Ibrahim told me that I would go to Ethiopia. He said the same thing to Ihab. He told us that we would go to see Ethiopia, the reason being that the Egyptian President may visit, as the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity is there.

Then Ihab and I came, I think on Ethiopian airlines, and stayed for 15 days and visited the country with our escort, a man called Muzafir.

Ihab and I, after familiarizing ourselves with the situation in Ethiopia, had to return by car as per the instruction given to us by Fathi. This was to know the time that it would take us and the costs to be incurred. Based on this and after studying all aspects, we started from Addis Ababa and went by car to Gondar. From Gondar we went to Matama, and from there to the Sudanese border town of Gadaref. Finally we reached Khartoum. We submitted a report about the route and the costs involved to Hysem because Mustafa Hamza was not there.

I stayed on the farm until I returned to Ethiopia for the second time.

Honestly, I cannot say for sure as to whether or not Mustafa Hamza was there at the time.

I remember that Izzat was there. He is the one that gave to me and to Ihab Yemeni passports and tickets, and the one who told us that we would go to Ethiopia and that on arrival in Ethiopia, Omar would explain everything to us. When we arrived in Ethiopia, Omar received us at the airport and took us to the house of Ato ...

While Ihab and I were sitting there, Omar told us that we may return to the Sudan. In the meantime, he said we would stay there at the house pending a decision on whether we would return to the Sudan or not.

After five days, he informed us that we were going to stay with them. On the same day, we went to the house they were living in. He took Ihab and me to Ato Meresa's house. In the house were Omar, Fathi, Khalifa, Mohammed, Turki and Hamza.

Omar began explaining about the plan to assassinate the President. In his explanation he said, "The past is past, we now discuss about the assignment of each person." He then explained that his role would be to carry the bag. He said if anything happened to him, Yassin would carry the bag.

The role of Siraj and Khalifa would be to monitor from a distance with binoculars.

As regards Ihab and Mohammed, their role was to use a car to block the car of President Hosni Mubarak.

Turki was to carry Kalashnikov. So would Hamza.

Ihab and Mohammed, other than driving the cars, are also to carry arms.

After discussing the plan, Ihab and I returned to the house that we had used for sleeping. They also spent the night in their house.

Omar came to inform us to move to a house from which we would all be deployed for the assassination mission the next day. Mohammed brought arms in his car.

Question: Can you shorten the story?

Answer: After being briefed about our mission the next morning we launched the attack, but the operation failed.

Question: What was your role?

Answer: As I told you previously, Omar was to carry the bag, and if anything happened to him I (Yassin) was to carry it. However, during the time of the operation, one incident occurred. This was the breaking down of the escape car. Omar told me to try hard. I tried hard, but it would not start. The car remained stuck in that condition.

Some were killed in the operation, others ran away. I returned to my house. In the meantime, something else happened, and this was that Omar burned my passport. This hurt me very much. I was very sad. Because of this, misunderstanding was created between us. Thereafter I decided to go back through the route that I knew before and spent the night near the bus station to purchase a bus ticket, which I did. Khalifa also travelled with me. After spending the night in a place whose name we do not know, we reached Gondar, and on the same night Khalifa and I were apprehended.

Khalifa

Question: What is the name of your organization? When were you recruited and when did you become a member?

Answer: Following the guidance of Allah, we entered Gama'a Al-Islamiya in 1991 and I joined the community of members. That same year I went on Umra to Saudi Arabia.

After that, I journeyed to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan, where I stayed according to God's will. From Afghanistan I returned to Pakistan and then to Ethiopia. After the aborted attempt, during which time I was in Ethiopia, I was captured at a location whose name I do not remember now on the border between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Question: What were you doing when your comrades were in the actual act of attempting to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak?

Answer: Following the guidance of Allah, we entered Gama'a Al-Islamiya in 1991 and I joined the community of members. That same year I went on Umra to Saudi Arabia.

Before getting married, I had neither a fiancee nor a girlfriend.

I used to pray regularly on Fridays at the Al-Kaba Mosque in western Aswan. The name of the Imam of the Mosque is Sheik Abdulrahman Mohammed. I left Egypt for Saudi Arabia for the Umra prayers in 1990. After staying there for a while, I left for Pakistan.

As soon as I arrived at the airport in Pakistan, cars coming from Al-Answar received us and took us to Beit Al-Answar.

Three days after arriving there, we drove by private car to Afghanistan. We received military training at a camp known as Alfaruk for two months.

From there, we returned to Beit Al-Answar, where we stayed for 3 or 7 days.

After the Soviet troops had left Afghanistan, we left for Jalalabad.

We then returned to Al-Answar. At that time, Pakistan was detaining people without residence permits. Because I didn't have such a permit, I was also detained.

I met Mustafa Hamza some days before being detained by the police. I asked him if a person who has a visa for Pakistan cannot return to his own country. He told me that one cannot but that I could join their party. I informed him that there were no

difficulties in my joining them. In the meantime, I was detained by the police.

In the meantime, the World Muslim League expressed its willingness to provide air tickets to all those detained Arabs who wanted to go anywhere. That is how I too got a ticket.

The ticket would take me from Pakistan to Kenya and from there to the Sudan. We were thus expelled from Pakistan to Kenya, from which we went on a three-day transit visit to the Sudan.

As soon as we arrived in the Sudan, we met Mustafa Hamza. He told us that we could work with them. That is how I became a member of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. When we arrived in the Sudan, there were Egyptians with me who were not members of the organization. I stayed with them because there were people in the Sudan who were receiving them.

When I was staying with them, I was wandering from place to place in Khartoum.

It was the Sudan Airways that took us to Khartoum from Nairobi. We had taken Pakistan Airways from Pakistan to Kenya.

When I was in the Sudan, I spent most of the time in residential quarters and farms owned by Gama'a Al-Islamiya.

Faisal

Question: What were your plans after entering Ethiopia? Before the assassination attempt? During the assassination attempt? After the assassination attempt?

What were you doing? What was your own part in the plot?

Answer: As soon as I entered Ethiopia and the weapons were smuggled in, my main job was to look after them in a secure place. Ah ... what is more, I had to buy two more Kalashnikov automatic rifles. This is because what was at our disposal was not enough. Also ... I had to rent a house for keeping the weapons in a safe place. What is more, brother Omar had also ordered me to procure an Ethiopian passport for a member of the team called Khalifa as a matter of urgency. However, I did not succeed in this venture. That is, I could not succeed in procuring the passport. I had no role in the actual assassination attempt. My responsibility was only to look after the weapons and to purchase whatever additional ones were required. What is more, all that was expected of me was to hand over all the weapons to my superiors. The man responsible for all - including the assassination attempt - was brother Omar. When he requested me to do so, I handed over all the weapons to him. I did not personally participate in the assassination attempt. Because the Muslims imprisoned in Ethiopia were appearing in court the same day, I attended the judicial

session. I knew a few members of the Muslim Youth League. As to my role after the assassination attempt, there was something brother Omar had ordered me to do. On the day of the assassination attempt, I did not take part in this because I did not know when he (Mubarak) was arriving. Omar himself had told me that my part was by then over. Before the assassination attempt, we had both gone together to collect the keys as soon as I had shown him the rented house. Later, however, because there were some young people with me, he assured me that my part of the job was over. After the assassination attempt, brother Omar told me to join their party after coming across me somewhere. And I joined the party. Brother Ihab and brother Hamza were with him. They were seriously wounded and bleeding profusely. I was ordered to bring them orange juice. They had phoned me that same afternoon. The same day at 5.00 p.m., I heard over the Arabic service of Radio Ethiopia that an assassination attempt had been carried out against Mubarak. Later brother Omar gave me a call. I joined them and bought them some orange juice.

Yassin

Question: What was the role of the Government of the Sudan when you were engaged in a spying mission in Ethiopia?

Answer: It was providing security cover to the Gama'a Al-Islamiya members in the Sudan so that the latter would not be exposed to the Egyptian security organ existing there. In this respect, the Government and security organ of the Sudan has provided immense assistance to the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. I do not like to give more details on this matter, as it would expose the Gama'a Al-Islamiya in the Sudan, as well as our brothers in Egypt. Furthermore, it would affect me personally when my case is brought before the court.

Khalifa

Question: What is the relationship between the Gama'a Al-Islamiya and the Government of the Sudan?

Answer: The relationship between members of the Government of the Sudan and the Gama'a Al-Islamiya is a political one. The Government of Egypt supports and encourages the Sudanese opposition forces. In turn, the Government of the Sudan has the possibility to use an instrument - a force - that it can utilize in Egypt. That's why Gama'a Al-Islamiya is allowed in the Sudan and any of its members is welcome in the country. Whether they come from Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, if their intention is to go to Egypt, to struggle for Allah, to destabilize the Egyptian system and institute an Islamic order, they are given all kinds of support.

As for the role of the Government of the Sudan, since it is an Islamic State, it promotes this plan and encourages its implementation because it follows the laws of Allah.

Faisal

Question: Can you describe the extent of the support you received from the Sudanese Government and security?

Answer: When Gama'a Al-Islamiya - the Egyptian organization - decided to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak, the relevant committee in the organization presented the idea to the National Islamic Front of the Sudan and to the Sudanese Government and security, and they accepted the idea. This can be proved by their providing weapons and security covers and by their making a farm available and facilitating the renting of houses and the purchase of cars. For all that they have done, we are grateful.

Question: What was the reaction of the National Islamic Front of the Sudan when Gama'a Al-Islamiya disclosed its plans to the organization? How ready was it to support your aims? Could you tell me in detail the conditions prevailing in Addis Ababa following your arrival here?

Answer: As soon as the operation was launched and as soon as the National Islamic Front of the Sudan was apprised of the plan by Gama'a Al-Islamiya (and Allah willing the plan would soon bear fruit), the organization welcomed it with open arms. The Front had demonstrated that it had no problems in collaborating with us. The cooperation was in the field of providing weapons. However, the plans were being carried out by members of the Gama'a Al-Islamiya. However, again, the assistance of the National Islamic Front, or Al-Jabha Al-Islamiya, was in the field of providing weapons. Later, when we entered Ethiopia, Fathi was with me. Ah ... he brought the arms in a carton. This carton was smuggled in through the airport without going through customs. It was diplomats, that is, Sudanese diplomats, who brought the weapons in, not ordinary passengers. I was briefed on these things by brother Fathi. The Front was in complete agreement with the idea behind smuggling in the weapons. Ah ... It is true to say that the Front was willing to help in providing weapons. That is how we got hold of the weapons. However, the plan was drawn up by senior members of the Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya in the Sudan. (Brother Fathi is the man otherwise known as Seraj who fled to Sudan on board Sudan Airways as soon as the attempted assassination failed.)

Question: I do not know this farm. Suppose your daughter Zahara is on the farm and you couldn't go to get her, and you asked someone to go and bring her, how would you describe the route?

Answer: If my daughter was at the farm and if I asked someone to bring her to me, I would tell him the following. If you start from the airport, you proceed to - lets call it the checkpoint - Soba. Twenty kilometres after this place you turn right, and you will see a sign and a house with a number of rooms. You will next see a pond, which distinguishes this farm from others.

Question: Please provide us with information on Mustafa Hamza.

Answer: Brother Mustafa Hamza is a university graduate. Following the assassination of President Sadat he was jailed, and when he left prison, he took over the responsibility of heading the military wing of Gama'a Al-Islamiya. He is married and has four children. His life in the Sudan is dedicated to serving Allah (God). He commences work at home; he also leaves his home and checks on the well-being of the young people at their site, and then proceeds to his special office. He knows much more about the Government of the Sudan than I do.

Question: Could you name some of the Sudanese visiting Mustafa Hamza's office? What were they talking about? Who were their employers? What was Mustafa Hamza's office telephone number? What did they look like?

Answer: Our Sudanese brothers who were frequenting Mustafa Hamza's office and our own residential quarters were Ibrahim, Awedelah, Mudesir or Wa-eil. When these people were coming even if there was only one man in the house, Mustafa Hamza would ask us to leave it for one or two hours ... His telephone number was 71025. Later, they were meeting somewhere else.

Question: What contacts does Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya maintain with the Sudanese Security Services?

Answer: If there is anything that Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya needs, this would be provided through the intermediary of the Sudanese Security Services. Mustafa Hamza is responsible on the part of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya. On the part of the National Islamic Front of the Sudan, four individuals were concerned. They could be perhaps members of the Sudanese Security Services. When the four Sudanese were coming, meetings were being conducted between responsible officials. Relations between the two organizations were being conducted on the basis of such a meeting. What this means, is that whatever Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya was in need of was being provided through these meetings.

Question: Could you brief us on relations between the National Islamic Front of the Sudan and the Sudanese Security Services? That is, if you know anything about it.

Answer: What I know is this: they are in control of the Government. Power is in their hands.

Question: Could you elaborate on relations between Mustafa Hamza on the one hand and the National Islamic Front of the Sudan and the Government of the Sudan on the other? What are the names of the committee members of the Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya? What are the names of the people visiting Mustafa Hamza? What roles did these play in the Sudanese Security Services?

Answer: Brother Mustafa Hamza was maintaining contacts with the National Islamic Front of the Sudan. The National Islamic Front has the Government of the Sudan and its branches under its complete control. Ah ... Members of the Front used to visit brother Mustafa Hamza's house. That is, they used to conduct regular meetings. Attending the meetings on behalf of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya were brother Mustafa Hamza, brother Fathi and brother Izzat. On the part of the Islamic Front, it was, I believe, Ibrahim, Awadalah and Mudesir.

Question: Faisal, do you feel any regrets for participating in such a plot? If so, why?

Answer: Praise be to Allah that we carried out such an accomplishment. Without any doubt, the act is something I shall be always proud of. That is to say, I take real pride in what I have done. It is another matter whether the attempt was successful or not. Our duty is only to carry out our task. We have done what it is humanly possible to do. We also prayed to Allah to crown our efforts with success. However, the attempt failed. We accept this with grace so long as it is the will of Allah. And this does not deter us for a moment from persisting in our efforts ... Granted that the attempt that, through the will of Allah, took place in Ethiopia was serious in nature, we beg forgiveness of the highest degree for what was done. I pray to Allah that Ethiopians will forgive us for what we have done. We are sorry that the attempt took place in Habasha (Ethiopia). The entire Muslim world knows what is meant by Habasha. In the name of Gama'a Al-Islamiya and myself, I beg the forgiveness of the deepest kind from Ethiopians. Because Ethiopians understand a little Arabic, I beg their forgiveness. Allah knows that I am saying these things from the bottom of my heart - that is, begging the forgiveness of Ethiopians. For the second time, I refer to Ethiopia as Habasha. For Muslims, Habasha was the land of exile for Muslims. Habasha is the sacred land of our Lord Muezzin Bilal, and the country of king Al-Negashi. The prophet Mohammed had urged his followers to go to Habasha for it was a land ruled by a wise king who was just and fair to all. Even if the assassination attempt was grievous in charter, I am hopeful that through the will of Allah, it will be accorded due forgiveness.

<u>Abeba Sirai</u>

Question: Who received you in the Sudan?

Answer: When we went to the Sudan, Ibrahim and Fathi met us, and they let us use a room in their house.

Question: Your sister received you with Ibrahim when you arrived in Khartoum. How did your sister and Ibrahim meet?

Answer: They met before we went to the Sudan. My father and I had told my husband that I had a sister in Khartoum. My husband told Ibrahim by telephone her name and where she went to school. My sister was aware

that we were going to the Sudan. My husband asked Ibrahim to bring her to the airport to meet us.

Question: How many children does Ibrahim have?

Answer: He has four children, all boys. The first one was about six years old and the youngest about two.

Question: Do you know their names?

Answer: One boy is called Khalid, I don't remember the names of the others.

Question: What does Ibrahim look like?

Answer: He is light complexioned. He looks like an Arab and so does his wife.

Question: And the house?

Answer: It is a two-storey house. Two Arab couples lived in it. We lived in one room on the ground floor. The only person I met, except for the group, was my sister.

Question: How did Ibrahim and his wife live with their children?

Answer: They lived there in the Sudan. I felt they had lived there for some time. They live comfortably well.

Question: Do they relax?

Answer: They do. They take walks by the water together, maybe once a week.

Question: How was Ibrahim's marriage? Was his wife Fatuma happy with him?

Answer: It seemed a happy marriage. She has been there with him for some time. They had a variety of food. Muna and Sowaya lived upstairs and they communicated through an intercom.

Question: Who received you when you returned to Ethiopia?

Answer: When we came back we were met by a person called Siraj who had rented a taxi. He took us to our house, which he had been living in for one month and six days when we were in the Sudan. As we entered the house, I saw two suitcases. I asked my husband about them, and he told me they contained automobile spare parts. The suitcases remained in the house for some six months ...

Question: Go on.

Answer: My husband, Faisal, said that he had something to do at the Sudanese Embassy and went there. At one point, Siraj asked me if I liked the Sudan and I told him I liked it. He asked me about Ibrahim's well-

being. When my husband found out about this conversation, he was very upset. He didn't want me to talk to any man, and since that time Siraj never returned to our house.

Question: Why did he go to the Embassy?

Answer: I don't know. Actually I asked him why, but he told me it was none of my business.

Question: But he told you where he was going.

Answer: He wasn't talking to me. He was telling him.

Question: Who?

Answer: Siraj?

Question: Was married life comfortable for you?

Answer: It was O.K. at the beginning. As time went on, I wondered why he didn't buy anything and I asked him about it. He told me that we would go to live in the Sudan. I refused. I told him I would not go to the Sudan. We kept on arguing until this happened.

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24 April 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, dated 24 April 1996, on the talks with the United Nations Secretariat.

I should be obliged if you would have the text of this letter and its annex, the statement by the Deputy Prime Minister, circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-10452 (E) 240496 240496

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Annex

Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq
dated 24 April 1996

Commenting on the results of the current stage of the talks with the United Nations, Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister, made the following statement:

The Iraqi delegation participating in discussions with the Secretariat, led by Ambassador Abdelamir Al-Ambari, has made every effort during the course of three long rounds of talks to reach agreement on the so-called "oil for food and medicine" formula, and has demonstrated, in accordance with instructions from the central authorities, the greatest possible flexibility in order to reach appropriate solutions to practical issues.

The first two rounds of talks between the Iraqi delegation and the United Nations Secretariat took place in a serious and professional climate. The two parties strove, in the context of an objective dialogue, to take into account their respective legitimate and practical concerns so as to find balanced solutions to practical issues.

The third round of talks began in the same spirit, raising the hope of reaching a balanced agreement, but the intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in these talks has dimmed that prospect and occasioned a reversal on the part of the United Nations delegation. There have been two successive interventions of this kind relating to aspects which had previously been the subject of objective and balanced agreement.

Mr. Tariq Aziz further stated that members of the Security Council, in particular the permanent members, had agreed from the start of the talks to entrust the Secretary-General with concluding an agreement with the Iraqi party and had undertaken not to intervene in the talks. Nevertheless, the United States and British parties have failed to respect that undertaking by directly intervening in the details of the talks, thus preventing the conclusion of an agreement at the close of the third round.

Mr. Tariq Aziz also stated that it had been decided, in the morning of 24 April 1996, by agreement with the Secretary-General, to begin a fourth round of talks at the beginning of May.

In addition, Mr. Tariq Aziz stated that Iraq had, from the outset, engaged in the talks in order to reach a balanced agreement that would not infringe on its sovereignty or threaten its national unity while meeting the concerns of the United Nations. However, the repeated and arbitrary interventions by the United States and the United Kingdom in the talks on practical issues were likely to compromise them.

Finally, Mr. Tariq Aziz called on the members of the Security Council to play their proper role by dealing with the question impartially and preventing other members of the Council from intervening in the talks for specific political reasons which contravened the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/319
25 April 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to report to the Security Council the refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to cooperate with the International Tribunal, as required by resolutions of the Council and the Tribunal's own Statute. The occasion for making this report is the failure of the said Republic to execute arrest warrants against three accused - Mile Mrkšic, Miroslav Radić and Veselin Šljivančanin - all of whom are on its territory and who are charged with the murder of 260 civilians and other unarmed men following the fall of the city of Vukovar in November 1991. On 3 April 1996, Trial Chamber I of the International Tribunal certified that the failure to effect service of the indictment was due to the refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to cooperate with the Tribunal, and entrusted the President of the Tribunal with notifying the Security Council thereof, in accordance with the procedure of Rule 61 (E). Accordingly, I now make this report to the Security Council.

The refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to cooperate with the International Tribunal should be seen in its broadest context. The International Tribunal was established by the Security Council in 1993 to respond to the appalling crimes that were taking place before the very eyes of the world in the former Yugoslavia. As the Tribunal was established by virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are under an obligation to assist it, notably by complying with its orders. The cooperation of the States of the former Yugoslavia is particularly imperative: without such cooperation, few accused would ever be delivered to The Hague to stand trial. To this day, however, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has not executed a single arrest warrant addressed to it.

In this case, the accused whom the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has failed to arrest, have, moreover, been commended and promoted by the said Republic for those same deeds which the Prosecutor charges

as crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In the words of the Prosecutor in his final submission in this case, the said Republic has

> "... promoted, supported and continued to pay an indicted war criminal [Šljivančanin] and to maintain him as a senior officer in their army, and if [...] reports are correct, they now even have him training officer cadets. Can there be any more flagrant way of showing their disregard and even contempt for their obligations as a Member State of the United Nations, obligations they recently reaffirmed by entering into the Dayton Accords?" (Transcript of the Hearing of 28 March 1996, pp. 45 and 46)

The Trial Chamber endorsed the spirit of this remark when confirming the indictment against the three accused.

As President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, it is my duty to bring non-compliance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the Tribunal's orders to the attention of the Security Council so that it can decide upon the appropriate response.

(Signed) Antonio CASSESE
President

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/320
10 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Some months ago, my Special Representative for Cyprus, Mr. Joe Clark, advised me that because of other commitments he would not be in a position to remain in this post much longer. However, he very kindly agreed to stay on until a suitable successor could be appointed.

I wish to take this opportunity to put on record my profound appreciation for the high degree of professionalism and devotion displayed by Mr. Joe Clark throughout his service as my Special Representative.

As my new Special Representative for Cyprus I have decided to appoint Mr. Han Sung-Joo, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, effective 1 May 1996. Mr. Gustave Feissel will continue as my Deputy Special Representative, resident in Cyprus, and as Chief of Mission of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-10598 (E) 250496 260496

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/320*
25 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Some months ago, my Special Representative for Cyprus, Mr. Joe Clark, advised me that because of other commitments he would not be in a position to remain in this post much longer. However, he very kindly agreed to stay on until a suitable successor could be appointed.

I wish to take this opportunity to put on record my profound appreciation for the high degree of professionalism and devotion displayed by Mr. Joe Clark throughout his service as my Special Representative.

As my new Special Representative for Cyprus I have decided to appoint Mr. Han Sung-Joo, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, effective 1 May 1996. Mr. Gustave Feissel will continue as my Deputy Special Representative, resident in Cyprus, and as Chief of Mission of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

96-10877 (E) 290496 300496

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/321
10 April 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 25 APRIL 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 18 April 1996 (S/1996/320) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Han Sung-Joo, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, as Special Representative for Cyprus has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Juan SOMAVÍA
President of the Security Council

96-10604 (E) 250496 250496 260496

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/321*
25 April 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 25 APRIL 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 18 April 1996 (S/1996/320) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Han Sung-Joo, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, as Special Representative for Cyprus has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Juan SOMAVÍA
President of the Security Council

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

96-10883 (E) 290496 300496

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/946
S/1996/322
29 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 26 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the European Union, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a declaration of the Presidency of the European Union on the decision adopted by the Palestinian National Council on the Palestinian Charter (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI

96-10862 (E) 290496 300496

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ANNEX

[Original: English and French]

Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the decision adopted by the Palestinian National Council on the Palestinian Charter

The European Union congratulates President Arafat and the Palestinian National Council on their decision of 24 April 1996, taken by an overwhelming majority, to amend the Palestinian Charter so that it will no longer deny the right of the State of Israel to exist.

The European Union wishes to underline its continuing commitment to the cause of peace and democracy, courageously undertaken by the Palestinian people and its leadership. The decision to amend the Charter, which constitutes a confirmation of the strong Palestinian desire to fulfil its undertakings, shows how widespread the support for peace is among the Palestinians, and how limited the following of those who are opposed to it through violent means and terrorist actions.

In this respect, the European Union is confident that the Government of Israel will respond to this gesture of the Palestinians by:

- Implementing all the agreements, including the withdrawal from Hebron;
- Continuing the peace talks which are expected to resume on 7 May;
- Ending the closure which has been imposed on the West Bank and Gaza since the beginning of March.

Rome, 26 April 1996

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/947
S/1996/323
29 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 27 April 1996 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the European Union, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a declaration of the Presidency of the European Union on the cease-fire in Lebanon (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Lorenzo FERRARIN
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-10869 (E) 290496 300496

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ANNEX

[Original: English and French]

Declaration of the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the cease-fire in Lebanon

The European Union wishes to express its deep satisfaction for the cease-fire reached in Lebanon, hoping that it will put an end to violence, and that the peace negotiations will continue also on the Lebanese track, implementing Security Council resolution 425 (1978), and contributing to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the European Union has deployed all its efforts in order to give its contribution to end the hostilities and to avoid the escalation of the crisis. The European Union reaffirms its commitment to pursue these diplomatic efforts aimed at promoting peace.

The European Union, while expressing its deep sorrow for the many victims among the civilians and for the material damage and suffering inflicted on the parties, intends to develop in direct consultations with the Lebanese authorities a European plan for the reconstruction of Lebanon and the emergency assistance for the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.

Rome, 27 April 1996

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/324
29 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 23 April 1996 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, stating that Mr. Oleg N. Chtcherbak and Mr. Vadim S. Smirnov have been appointed alternate representatives of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

96-10889 (E) 290496 300496

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/325
29 April 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the meeting held on 15 March 1996 by the Security Council on the situation in Somalia, during which a number of ideas were put forward on how the international community might address that situation. Having given careful consideration to these ideas, I wish to share the following observations with the members of the Council.

Regarding the suggestion to relocate the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) from Nairobi to a location within Somalia, it should be noted that Mogadishu would not at present be a practical option for two reasons: first, it would force the United Nations to choose between the North and the South of the divided city, thereby inviting refusal from one or the other main faction to deal with UNPOS; and second, the increased tension brought about by recent fighting between the forces of Mr. Osman Atto and those of General Aidid has heightened security concerns in the Somali capital. As for other locations within Somalia, they would hardly serve their purpose since an UNPOS based away from Mogadishu would have little contact with faction leaders elsewhere. One possibility for future consideration could be for UNPOS to establish a sub-office in a city such as Bossasso in the Northeast. However, this would have financial implications.

I have also considered the idea of appointing a high-level African personality to undertake a goodwill mission to Somalia, although it might be difficult to find a personality who would accept such an undertaking, given the intractability of the problems and the intransigence of the Somali factions. In addition, as you will recall, my efforts to dispatch envoys on two earlier occasions did not succeed because of the objections of at least one of the faction leaders concerned. I trust therefore that the Council will understand my reluctance to give those in Somalia who are not well disposed towards the idea of such a mission another opportunity to frustrate an initiative by the United Nations.

A fact-finding mission dispatched jointly by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) could be subject to the same difficulties. The OAU has been unable to dispatch such a mission for some time for reasons similar to those that have prevented me from sending an envoy. There is little

reason to believe that a joint United Nations/OAU mission would elicit a different reaction. Nevertheless, a joint mission might have a better chance of being accepted if it were sent at the express request of the Security Council. I am therefore exploring the feasibility of such a mission with the Secretary-General of the OAU.

The importance of reopening the Mogadishu seaport was also emphasized during the Security Council's meeting of 15 March. As you will recall, prior to the withdrawal of UNOSOM II from Somalia, the two sides in Mogadishu, with UNOSOM II's assistance, had signed a number of agreements to manage the port jointly and to ensure its smooth operation. However, disputes quickly emerged between the factions involved, particularly over the distribution of tax revenues, and led to the closure of the port. Nothing has occurred since then to change the situation.

As you know, the United Nations system has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Somalia, often under very difficult conditions. A recent inter-agency humanitarian mission to this country noted that the overall situation was still fragile, with serious threats of famine should the major harvest next August fail and the security situation deteriorate. The mission concluded that the continued presence of United Nations agencies in Somalia was essential in spite of the prevailing insecurity and operational difficulties. It strongly recommended that a Humanitarian Programme for Somalia cover humanitarian and rehabilitation needs on the basis of a regional approach. For effective assistance, the provision of adequate resources will be essential. To this end, a United Nations consolidated resource mobilization document for Somalia is under preparation. It will reflect a common United Nations strategy, including a short-term emergency contingency plan. I hope that United Nations humanitarian activities in Somalia will continue to benefit from the special attention and support of the members of the Council and the donor community.

I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/326
2 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my report to the Security Council on the situation in Tajikistan dated 22 March 1996 (S/1996/212), in which I informed members, inter alia, that my Special Envoy for Tajikistan, Mr. Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, had assumed an important post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and could not continue to perform the functions of my Special Envoy. I also mentioned that I would shortly inform the Council of the arrangements I would be making to replace him.

I have now decided to appoint Mr. Gerd Merrem (Germany), currently the Deputy Executive Director of the United Nations Drug Control Programme, as my Special Representative for Tajikistan. He will be based in Dushanbe, where he will perform the functions of Head of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), and also provide good offices in the inter-Tajik political dialogue.

The Government of Tajikistan and the leadership of the Tajik opposition, in separate communications to me, have concurred with the appointment of Mr. Merrem and stated their readiness to cooperate fully with him.

I should be grateful if you would bring the information contained in the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-11216 (E) 020596 030596

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/327
2 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 MAY 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 26 April 1996 (S/1996/326) concerning the appointment of Mr. Gerd Merrem (Germany) as your Special Representative for Tajikistan has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They welcome the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) QIN Huasun
President of the Security Council

96-11222 (E) 020596 030596